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1 Introduction
We study two cooperative solutions for a class of markets with indivisible goods modeled as
generalized assignment games. Shapley and Shubik (1972) dened an assignment game as
a market where each seller owns one indivisible object and each buyer, who wants to buy at
most one object, has valuations over all objects. An assignment is a description of deliveries
of objects from sellers to buyers and a price vector is a list of prices, one for each object.
A competitive equilibrium of a market is a price vector and a feasible assignment at which
each seller maximizes revenues, each buyer maximizes net valuations, and markets clear.
Shapley and Shubik (1972) showed that the set of competitive equilibria is non-empty, com-
petitive equilibrium assignments are optimal (the rst welfare theorem holds), any optimal
assignment is part of a competitive equilibrium with any of the competitive equilibrium
price vectors (a strong version of the second welfare theorem holds without requiring any
redistribution of the initial endowments), and the set of competitive equilibrium payo¤s
coincides with the Core of a naturally associated TU game (no enlargement or replica of
the market is required for their coincidence).
We consider a generalized assignment game representing a market with a given number
of indivisible units of di¤erent goods, where sellers may own di¤erent units of each of
the goods and buyers, who may want to buy several units of di¤erent goods up to an
exogenous total amount, have constant marginal valuations of each good. Jaume, Massó,
and Neme (2009) extend Shapley and Shubik (1972)s results for this generalized assignment
game. In particular, they show that the set of competitive equilibria is non-empty, it is
the Cartesian product of the set of competitive equilibrium price vectors and the set of
optimal assignments, the set of competitive equilibrium price vectors has a lattice structure
with the natural partial order of vectors  to be larger or equal than, and this lattice
structure is partly translated in a dual way to the sets of buyers and sellersutilities that
are attainable at competitive equilibria.
In this paper we study two di¤erent cooperative solutions for this class of markets and
their relationship with the set of competitive equilibrium payo¤s. The two solutions di¤er
on how a coalition of buyers and sellers can block a proposed payo¤ vector. Given an
assignment and a coalition of buyers and sellers, some of them may be buying or selling
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some units of some goods to sellers or buyers outside the coalition. The notion of the Core
corresponds to the notion of blocking that requires that all members of the coalition have to
break all exchanges performed with all agents outside the coalition and buy or sell only with
members within the coalition. In contrast, the concept of Set-wise stability corresponds to
the notion of blocking that admits that members of the coalition may completely or partly
keep their exchanges performed with non-members. Since Set-wise blocking is easier than
Core-wise blocking, the Set-wise stable set is a subset of the Core. We show here that the
non-empty set of competitive equilibrium payo¤s is contained in the Set-wise stable set.
Hence, the Set-wise stable set as well as the Core are non-empty. Moreover, we exhibit two
simple markets showing that these inclusions may be strict.
The main contribution of the paper is to answer a¢ rmatively the following question. Do
the Core and the Set-wise stable set converge to the set of competitive equilibrium payo¤s
when the market becomes large? The question is relevant because competitive equilibrium
requires price-taking behavior which only makes sense when individual quantity decisions
are perceived by each agent as being negligible. To create a setting where price-taking
behavior is meaningful we follow the well established tradition in Economics to enlarge the
environment by replicating the market. We rst show that the Core converges to the set
of competitive equilibrium payo¤s when the number of replica tends to innity and hence,
the Set-wise stable set converges as well. However, we show that the Set-wise stable set
already coincides with the set of competitive equilibrium payo¤s for a two-fold replicated
market. Finally, we show that for any number of replicas there is a market with a Core
payo¤ that is not a competitive equilibrium payo¤. Thus, the notion of Set-wise stability
is much closer (not only in terms of set-wise inclusion) to competitive equilibrium than the
notion of Core.
There are many other papers that recently have studied the relationship between the set
of competitive equilibrium payo¤s and alternative cooperative solutions in many-to-one or
many-to-many generalizations of Shapley and Shubik (1972)s assignment game. Sotomayor
(1992 and 1999a) study a many-to-many assignment game with two nite and disjoint sets
of agents. Each agent from each side can form a maximal number of partnerships with the
agents from the other side. Each partnership generates a total payo¤ that may be shared
by its two members. Observe that in this extension partnerships are binary; specically, if
a buyer and a seller form a partnership they can exchange just one indivisible unit of the
good held by the seller. Sotomayor (1992) proves that all pair-wise stable assignments are
optimal and Sotomayor (1999a) shows that the set of pair-wise stable payo¤s has a complete
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and dual lattice structure. Sotomayor (1999b) proposes the notion of Set-wise stability for
the former model and shows that the pair-wise stable set (that may be empty) is a subset
of the Core. Camiña (2006) studies a market with one seller, that owns a given number of
(potentially) di¤erent objects, and several buyers who want to buy at most one object. She
shows that the Core and the Set-wise stable set coincide, the set of competitive equilibrium
payo¤s is non-empty and it is a subset of the Core. Moreover, she shows that the Core has
a complete lattice structure with the partial order coming from comparing buyerspayo¤
vectors with the partial order  and this structure is not dual. Sotomayor (2007) studies a
generalized assignment game similar to ours but with two important di¤erences: (i) sellers
only own units of a unique good and each good is only owned by a particular seller and
(ii) buyers may want to buy several units but partnerships are also binary because buyers
are not interested in buying more than one unit from each seller. She shows that the set
of competitive equilibrium payo¤s is a non-empty, complete and dual lattice. Sotomayor
(2009) extends Sotomayor (1992 and 1999a) and considers a time-sharing assignment game
where both buyers and sellers own a xed amount of a divisible good (labor time) and to
form a partnership a buyer and a seller have to agree to contribute each with the same
amount of labor time and to share, in a particular proportion, the amount of money that
is proportionally obtained from the jointly contributed amount of labor time. Sotomayor
(2009) studies di¤erent solution concepts for di¤erent kinds of coalitional interactions. In
particular, she shows the inclusion relationships that hold among the non-empty sets of
competitive equilibrium payo¤s, the Core, the Set-wise stable set, the Strong stable set
and the set of dual allocations. Moreover, she also shows that some of these sets have a
lattice structure. Milgrom (2009) introduces and studies the space of assignment messages
to investigate (and solve) the di¢ culty that agents face when reporting their types(or
valuations of goods, or sets of goods) in some mechanism design settings. The model is
very general and contains as particular cases multi-unit auctions (with substitutable goods),
exchange economies, and integer assignment games. Milgrom (2009) focuses on the study
of the non-emptyness of the set of competitive equilibrium prices and its lattice structure
but he does not analyze any cooperative solution. Jaume, Massó, and Neme (2009) study
using linear programming the same model than the present one but they only focus on the
study of the Cartesian product and lattice structures of the set of competitive equilibria
and the corresponding sets of agentsutilities.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we dene a market. In Section 3 we
present the notions of Core and Set-wise stability and show that the Set-wise stable set is a
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non-empty subset of the Core. In Section 4, and closely following Jaume, Massó, and Neme
(2009), we dene a competitive equilibrium of a market. We then show that the non-empty
set of competitive equilibrium payo¤s is contained in the Set-wise stable set. In Section 5
we dene, for any positive integer , a  fold replica of a market and show in Theorem 1
that the limit of the sequence of the Cores of replicated markets coincides with the set of
competitive equilibrium payo¤s when the number of replicas tends to innity. In Theorem
2 we show that the Set-wise stable set of a two-fold replicated market already coincides
with the set of competitive equilibrium payo¤s. Finally, in Theorem 3 we show that for any
number of replicas there is a market with a Core payo¤that is not a competitive equilibrium
payo¤. An appendix at the end of the paper collects the proofs that have been omitted in
the main text.
2 Preliminaries
A generalized assignment game (a market) consists of seven objects. Three nite and
disjoint sets: the set B = fb1; :::; bmg of buyers, the set G = fg1; :::; gng of goods, and the
set S = fs1; :::; stg of sellers. We identify a generic buyer with bi or with just i, a generic
good with gj or with just j, and a generic seller with sk or with just k.
Buyers have a constant marginal valuation of each good. Let vij  0 be the monetary
valuation that buyer i assigns to each unit of good j; namely, vij is the maximum price that
buyer i is willing to pay for each unit of good j: Denote by V = (vij)(i;j)2BG the matrix of
valuations. We assume that buyer i 2 B can buy at most di 2 Z+nf0g units in total, where
Z+ is the set of non-negative integers. The strictly positive integer di should be interpreted
as a capacity constraint due to limits on is ability for storage, transport, etc. Denote by
d = (di)i2B the vector of maximal demands. Each seller k 2 S has qjk 2 Z+ indivisible
units of each good j 2 G. Denote by Q = (qjk)(j;k)2GS the capacity matrix. Let rjk  0
be the monetary valuation that seller k assigns to each unit of good j; that is, rjk is the
reservation (or minimum) price that seller k is willing to accept for each unit of good j.
Denote by R = (rjk)(j;k)2GS the matrix of reservation prices. Some sellers may not have
any unit of some of the goods. However, we require that the sellers reservation price of
a good that he has no units to sell has to be equal to zero; namely, for all k 2 S and all
j 2 G,
if qjk = 0 then rjk = 0: (1)
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We also assume that there is a strictly amount of each good; namely,
for each j 2 G there exists k 2 S such that qjk > 0: (2)
A market M is a 7-tuple (B;G; S; V; d; R;Q) satisfying conditions (1) and (2). Shapley
and Shubik (1972)s (one-to-one) assignment game is a special case of a market where each
buyer can buy at most one unit, there is only one unit of each good, and each seller only
owns one unit of one of the goods; i.e., di = 1 for all i 2 B, n = t, and for all (j; k) 2 GS,
qjk = 1 if j = k and qjk = 0 if j 6= k.
LetM be a market. An assignment for marketM is a three-dimensional integer matrix
A = (Aijk)(i;j;k)2BGS 2 ZBGS+ describing a collection of deliveries of units of the goods
from buyers to sellers. Each Aijk should be interpreted as buyer i receives Aijk units of
good j from seller k.We often omit the sets to which the subscripts belong to and write, for
instance,
P
ijk Aijk and
P
iAijk instead of
P
(i;j;k)2BGS Aijk and
P
i2B Aijk, respectively.
The assignment A is feasible for market M if each buyer i buys at most di units and
each seller k sells at most qjk units of each good j. We are only interested on feasible
assignments. Denote by F the set of all feasible assignments of market M ; namely,
F = fA 2 ZBGS+ j
P
jk Aijk  di for all i 2 B and
P
iAijk  qjk for all (j; k) 2 G Sg:
For each (i; j; k) 2 B G S; let
 ijk =
(
vij   rjk if qjk > 0
0 if qjk = 0
(3)
be the per unit gain from trade of good j between buyer i and seller k. If seller k does not
have any unit of good j the per unit gain from trade of good j with all buyers is equal to
zero. The total gain from trade of market M at assignment A is
TM (A) =
P
ijk  ijk  Aijk:
Denition 1 A feasible assignment eA is optimal for market M if, for any feasible assign-
ment A 2 F , TM( eA)  TM (A) :
Let eF be the set of all optimal assignments for market M . The set eF is always non-
empty.1
1See Milgrom (2009) for a proof of this statement in a more general model. See Jaume, Massó and
Neme (2009) for a proof of the statement using only linear programming arguments in the same model as
the one studied here.
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3 Cooperative Solutions
We present now two alternative cooperative solutions for market M . They di¤er on how a
coalition (a subset) of agents can block a proposal of how to distribute among all agents
the total gain from trade obtained at any optimal assignment. The Core assumes that
members of a blocking coalition can only form partnerships among themselves and have
to break all former partnerships with non-members. Set-wise stability allows members of
a blocking coalition to keep or reduce their former exchanges with members outside the
blocking coalition. Thus, Set-wise blocking is easier than Core-wise blocking. It seems to
us that Set-wise stability is also a more reasonable solution for this class of markets. Our
results will indicate from two points of view that Set-wise stability is closer to the set of
competitive equilibrium payo¤s than the Core is: (i) (set inclusion) closer and (ii) Set-
wise stability and the set of competitive equilibrium payo¤s already coincide in a two-fold
replicated market.
3.1 Core
Let M = (B;G; S; V; d; R;Q) be a market and let C  B [ S be a coalition. Denote
the subsets of buyers and sellers in C by BC = C \ B and SC = C \ S, respectively.
The submarket MC is the (natural) restriction of market M to coalition C; namely, MC
is the market (BC ; GC ; SC ; V C ; dC ; RC ; QC), where GC = fj 2 G jthere exists k 2 SC
such that qjk > 0g, V C = (vij)(ij)2BCGC , dC = (di)i2BC , RC = (rjk)(j;k)2GCSC , and
QC = (qjk)(j;k)2GCSC :
Denition 2 A feasible assignment A is Core compatible with coalition C if Aijk 6= 0
implies fi; kg  C:
That is, a feasible assignment A is Core compatible with C if all members of C interact
only among themselves. Let A be an assignment Core compatible with coalition C and de-
note by AC the feasible assignment for submarket MC , where AC = (Aijk)(i;j;k)2BCGCSC :
When the reference coalition is clear from the context we often omit the superscript C.
Denote by FC the set of feasible assignments for submarket MC and by eFC the set of its
optimal assignments; i.e.,
eFC = fAC 2 FC j TMC (AC)  TMC ( eAC) for all eAC 2 FCg:
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Fix a market M: To dene a cooperative game v with transferable utility associated to
M , let C  B [ S be a coalition and set
v(C) = TM
C
( eAC);
where eAC is any optimal assignment of submarket MC . Namely, v(C) is the maximal
total utility that members of C can guarantee by exchanging their resources only among
themselves. Obviously, v(C) = 0 for all C such that either BC = ? or SC = ?, and hence,
v(?) = 0. Moreover, v(fig) = 0 for all i 2 B and v(fkg) = 0 for all k 2 S.
Let M be a market. A pair (u;w) 2 RB  RS is a (feasible) payo¤ of market M ifP
i2B
ui +
P
k2S
wk = v(B [ S):
A payo¤ of market M is a distribution among agents of the total gains from trade at any
optimal assignment of market M .
Denition 3 A payo¤ (u;w) 2 RB  RS of market M is Core blocked by coalition C 
B [ S if P
i2BC
ui +
P
k2SC
wk < v(C):
Denition 4 A payo¤ (u;w) 2 RB  RS of market M belongs to the Core if there does
not exist a coalition C  B [ S such that (u;w) is Core blocked by C.
Let C be the set of payo¤s belonging to the Core of market M . When we want to
emphasize market M we write CM . Proposition 1 below states that the Core is always
non-empty.
Proposition 1 Every market has a non-empty Core.
Proof See the appendix. 
3.2 Set-wise Stability
The notion of Core blocking requires that all members of the blocking coalition have to give
up all previous exchange agreements with non-members. However this may be too drastic
because, in some circumstances, it is reasonable to let members of the blocking coalition to
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keep some (or all) previous exchanges with members outside the blocking coalition. This
stronger notion of blocking gives rise to the notion of Set-wise stability.2
Denition 5 Let M be a market and C be a coalition. A feasible assignment bA for market
M is SW compatible with C if there exists an optimal assignment eA 2 eF such that:
(i) For every i 2 BC ; bAijk > 0 implies that either k 2 SC or else bAijk  eAijk:
(ii) For every k 2 SC ; bAijk > 0 implies that either i 2 BC or else bAijk  eAijk:
(iii) For every i =2 BC and k =2 SC ; bAijk = 0 for every j 2 G.
Let M be a market. A three-dimensional matrix   = ( ijk)(i;j;k)2BGS is a distribution
matrix if for all (i; j; k) 2 B G S such that vij  rjk, it holds that vij   ijk  rjk. Let
  be a distribution matrix and assume vij  rjk for some (i; j; k) 2 B G S. Then,  ijk
describes a way of how buyer i and seller k could split the gain vij   rjk that they would
obtain from trading one unit of good j: buyer i receives vij    ijk and seller k receives
 ijk   rjk. If vij < rjk then the value  ijk will be irrelevant because i and k do not trade
good j at any optimal assignment. Observe that a distribution matrix is not necessarily
anonymous because a buyer can obtain di¤erent per unit gains from buying good j from
two di¤erent sellers, and viceversa.
Denition 6 A payo¤ (u;w) 2 RB  RS for market M is SW blocked by coalition C 
B[S if for any distribution matrix   = ( ijk)(i;j;k)2BGS there exists a feasible assignmentbA that is SW compatible with C andP
i2BC
ui +
P
k2SC
wk <
P
(i;j;k)2BCGSC
 ijk  bAijk + P
(i;j;k)2BCG(SC)c
(vij    ijk)  bAijk
+
P
(i;j;k)2(BC)cGSC
( ijk   rjk)  bAijk:
Namely, members of a coalition SW block a payo¤vector if independently of the agree-
ments they have with non-members they can jointly obtain a strictly higher payo¤ by reas-
signing their exchanges among themselves and by keeping or reducing their exchanges with
non-members.
Denition 7 A payo¤ (u;w) 2 RB RS for market M is Set-wise stable if there does not
exist a coalition C  B [ S such that (u;w) is SW blocked by coalition C.
2Sotomayor (1999b) denes and studies this concept for a many-to-many generalization of Shapley and
Shubik (1972)s assignment game. See also Sotomayor (2007 and 2009) for an analysis of Set-wise stability
in her time-sharing assignment games.
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Denote by SW the set of Set-wise stable payo¤s. When we want to emphasize market
M we write SWM : Let (u;w) 2 RBRS be a payo¤of marketM and assume that coalition
C Core blocks (u;w). Let eAC 2 eFC be arbitrary. Then,P
i2BC
ui +
P
k2SC
wk < v(C) = T
MC ( eAC):
Let bA be the feasible assignment where, for all (i; j; k) 2 B G S,
bAijk = ( eACijk if (i; k) 2 BC  SC
0 otherwise.
Then, bA is a feasible assignment SW compatible with C and for any distribution matrix
 , P
i2BC
ui +
P
k2SC
wk <
P
(i;j;k)2BCGSC
 ijk  bAijk + P
(i;j;k)2BCG(SC)c
(vij    ijk)  bAijk
+
P
(i;j;k)2(BC)cGSC
( ijk   rjk)  bAijk:
= TM
C
( eAC):
Hence, coalition C SW blocks (u;w): Thus, the Set-wise stable set is a subset of the Core.
For further reference, we state this fact below as Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 For any market the Set-wise stable set is a subset of the Core.
4 Competitive Equilibria and Basic Results
4.1 Denitions and Preliminaries
We dene a competitive equilibrium of market M by following Jaume, Massó and Neme
(2009). Assume buyers and sellers trade through competitive markets. That is, there is a
unique market (and its corresponding unique price) for each of the goods and buyers and
sellers are price-takers. Given a price vector p = (pj)j2G 2 RG+ sellers supply units of the
goods (up to their capacity) in order to maximize revenues at p and buyers demand units
of the goods (up to their maximal demands) in order to maximize the total net valuation
at p.
Supply of seller k: For each price vector p = (pj)j2G 2 RG+, seller k supplies of every
good j any feasible amount that maximizes revenues; namely,
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Sjk(pj) =
8><>:
fqjkg if pj > rjk
f0; 1; :::; qjkg if pj = rjk
f0g if pj < rjk:
(4)
To dene the demands of buyers we need the following notation. Let p 2 RG+ be given
and consider buyer i. Let
r>i (p) = fj 2 G j vij   pj = max
j02G
fvij0   pj0g > 0g (5)
be the set of goods that give to buyer i the maximum (and strictly positive) net valuation
at p. Obviously, for some p; the set r>i (p) may be empty. Let
ri (p) = fj 2 G j vij   pj = max
j02G
fvij0   pj0g  0g (6)
be the set of goods that give to buyer i the maximum (and non-negative) net valuation at
p. Obviously, for some p; the set ri (p) may also be empty. Obviously, for all p 2 Rn+ and
all i 2 B,
r>i (p)  ri (p): (7)
Demand of buyer i: For each price vector p = (pj)j2G 2 Rn+, buyer i demands any
feasible amounts of the goods that maximize the net valuations at p; namely,
Di(p) = f = (jk)(j;k)2GS 2 ZGS j (D.a) jk  0 for all (j; k) 2 G S,
(D.b)
P
jk jk  di;
(D.c) r>i (p) 6= ; =)
P
jk jk = di; and
(D.d)
P
k jk > 0 =) j 2 ri (p)g:
Thus, Di(p) describes the set of all trades that maximize the net valuation of buyer i at
p: Observe that the set of trades described by each element in the set Di(p) give the same
net valuation to buyer i; i.e., i is indi¤erent among all trade plans  2 Di(p):
Let A be an assignment and let i be a buyer. We denote by A(i) = (A(i)jk)(j;k)2GS the
element in ZGS+ such that, for all (j; k) 2 G S, A(i)jk = Aijk:
Denition 8 A competitive equilibrium of market M is a pair (p;A) 2 RG+  F  RG+ 
ZBGS+ such that:
(E.D) For each buyer i 2 B; A(i) 2 Di (p) :
(E.S) For each good j 2 G and each seller k 2 S; PiAijk 2 Sjk (pj) :
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We say that a price vector p and a feasible assignment A are compatible if (p;A) is a
competitive equilibrium of marketM . The vector p 2 RG+ is a competitive equilibrium price
of market M if there exists A 2 F such that (p;A) is a competitive equilibrium of market
M .
Let eP be the set of competitive equilibrium prices of market M: The set eP is always
non-empty.3 For further reference, we state this fact without proof as a proposition below.
Proposition 3 The set of competitive equilibrium prices of any market is non-empty.
Moreover, by Proposition 4 in Jaume, Massó, and Neme (2009), the set of competitive
equilibria has a Cartesian product structure. We also state this fact without proof as
Proposition 4.
Proposition 4 Let M be a market. Then, (p;A) is a competitive equilibrium of M if
and only if p 2 eP and A 2 eF .
4.2 The Set of Competitive Equilibrium Payo¤s
Let p 2 RG+ be a price vector and A 2 F a feasible assignment of market M: We dene
the utility of buyer i 2 B at the pair (p;A) as the total net gain obtained by i from his
exchanges specied by A at price p. We denote it by ui(p;A); namely,
ui(p;A) =
P
jk
(vij   pj)  Aijk:
We dene the utility of seller k 2 S at the pair (p;A) as the total net gain obtained by k
from his exchanges specied by A at price p. We denote it by wk(p;A); namely,
wk(p;A) =
P
ij
(pj   rjk)  Aijk:
Given (p;A), denote by u(p;A) = (ui(p;A))i2B and w(p;A) = (wk(p;A))k2S the vector of
buyers and sellersutilities at (p;A), respectively. Let
CE = f(u;w) 2 RB  RS j there exists (ep; eA) 2 eP  eF s.t. (u;w) = (u(ep; eA); w(ep; eA))g
be the set of Competitive Equilibrium payo¤s of market M . However, competitive equi-
librium payo¤ vectors are independent of the particular optimal assignment. To see that,
3For the proof of this statement in a more general model see Milgrom (2009), and for a proof in our
setting using only linear programming see Jaume, Massó and Neme (2009).
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dene the mappings of per-unit gains () : RG+ ! RB and () : RG+ ! RGS as follows.
Let p 2 RG+ be given. For each i 2 B, dene
i(p) =
(
vij   pj if there exists j 2 r>i (p)
0 otherwise,
(8)
and for each (j; k) 2 G S, dene
jk (p) =
(
pj   rjk if pj   rjk > 0
0 otherwise.
(9)
The number i(p) is the gain obtained by buyer i from each unit that he wants to buy at
p (if any) and the number jk(p) is the prot obtained by seller k from each unit of good
j that he wants to sell at p (if any).
Let ep 2 eP be a competitive equilibrium price of market M and let ((ep); (ep)) be its
associated per unit gains. Dene (u(ep); w(ep)) 2 RB  RS by
ui(ep) = di  i(ep) for all i 2 B and (10)
wk(ep) = P
j2G
qjk  jk(ep) for all k 2 S:
By Lemma 6 in Jaume, Massó, and Neme (2009), the set of competitive equilibrium payo¤s
of market M can also be written as
CE = f(u;w) 2 RB  RS j there exists ep 2 eP such that(u;w) = (u(ep); w(ep))g; (11)
that is, the set of competitive equilibrium payo¤s of market M can be described without
explicitly referring to any particular optimal assignment because, for all eA 2 eF , ui(ep; eA) =
ui(ep) for all i 2 B and wk(ep; eA) = wk(ep) for all k 2 S.
4.3 Basic Results
In this subsection we describe the inclusion relationships among the set of competitive
equilibrium payo¤s, Set-wise stability and Core. First, the set of competitive equilibrium
payo¤s is contained in the set of Set-wise stable payo¤s.
Proposition 5 Let ep 2 eP be a competitive equilibrium price vector of market M . Then,
(u(ep); w(ep)) 2 SW.
Proof See the appendix. 
12
Proposition 5 above says that
CE  SW : (12)
Thus, by Proposition 3, SW 6= ?. Example 1 below shows that the inclusion in (12) may
be strict because there exist markets with a payo¤ (u;w) 2 RBRS with the property that
(u;w) 2 SWnCE :
Example 1 Let M = (B; S;G; V; d; R;Q) be a market where B = fb1g, G = fg1; g2g,
S = fs1g, V = (8; 4), d1 = 6, R0 = (4; 2), and Q0 = (3; 3), where X 0 is the transposed
matrix of X. The unique optimal assignment of market M is eA0 =  eA111; eA121 = (3; 3)
and
TM( eA) = (v11   r11)  eA111 + (v21   r21)  eA121 = 12 + 6 = 18:
It is easy to see that the set of equilibrium price vectors of market M is eP = f(ep1; ep2) 2
RG+ j 2  ep2  4 and 8  ep1 = 4  ep2g: For every ep 2 eP , the per-unit gains are
1(ep) = v11   ep1 = v12   ep2
and
11(ep) = ep1   r11 and 21(ep) = ep2   r21:
Moreover u1(ep) = 1(ep)  6 and w1(ep) = 11(ep)  3 + 21(ep)  3:
Consider the payo¤ (u1; w1) = (15; 3). We rst show that (u1; w1) 2 SW. Let   =
( 111; 121) = (4; 3) be a distribution matrix and let C be a coalition. Consider the following
three cases:
Case 1: C = fb1; s1g: Since u1 + w1 = 18 = TM( eA) coalition C can not SW block the
payo¤ (u1; w1) = (15; 3).
Case 2: C = fb1g: We have to show that for any bA such that bA111  eA111 = 3 andbA121  eA121 = 3;
u1  (v11    111)  bA111 + (v12    121)  bA121:
But this holds because
u1 = 15 = (8  4)  3 + (4  3)  3  4  bA111 + bA121:
Case 3: C = fs1g: We have to show that for any bA such that bA111  eA111 = 3 andbA121  eA121 = 3;
w1  ( 111   r11)  bA111 + ( 121   r21)  bA121:
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But this holds because
w1 = 3 = (4  4)  3 + (3  2)  3  bA121:
Finally, we show that there does not exist a competitive equilibrium price vector ep such
that (u(ep); w(ep)) = (15; 3): Assume otherwise; then, by (10), 15 = 1(ep)  6 and hence,
1(ep) = 52 . Thus,
1(ep) = 52 = v12   ep2 = 4  ep2
and ep2 = 32 : But this contradicts that 2  ep2  4: 
Observe that the distribution matrix used in the denition of Set-wise stability is not
necessarily anonymous (i.e.,  ijk could be di¤erent to  i0jk0). However, the subset of Set-
wise stable payo¤s that are obtained from anonymous distribution matrices (i.e., price
vectors) is indeed the set of competitive equilibrium payo¤ vectors. We state this fact as
Proposition 6 below.
Proposition 6 Let (u;w) 2 RB  RS be a payo¤ of market M . Then, (u;w) 2 CE if
and only if there exists a competitive equilibrium price vector ep such that for every coalition
C  B [ S and any feasible assignment bA SW compatible with C we have thatP
i2BC
ui +
P
k2SC
wk 
P
(i;j;k)2BCGSC
 ijk  bAijk+ P
(i;j;k)2BCG(SC)c
(vij   epj) bAijk:+ P
(i;j;k)2(BC)cGSC
(epj   rjk) bAijk:
Proof See the appendix. 
Example 2 below shows that the Set-wise stable set may be a strict subset of the Core
because there exist markets with (u;w) 2 CnSW :
Example 2 Let M = (B; S;G; V; d; R;Q) be a market where B = fb1g, G = fg1g
S = fs1; s2g, v11 = 2, d1 = 3, R0 = (1; 1), and Q0 = (2; 2). Market M only has two optimal
assignments: eA10 = ( eA1111; eA1112) = (2; 1) and eA20 = ( eA2111; eA2112) = (1; 2) : Observe that
TM( eA10) = (v11   r11)  eA1111 + (v12   r12)  eA1112 = 1  2 + 1  1 = 3 = TM( eA20):
We rst show that SW = f(3; 0; 0)g. Let (u1; w1; w2) 2 SW be arbitrary. Then,
u1 +w1 +w2 = 3 and let   = ( 111; 112) be any distribution matrix. Let C be a singleton
coalition. Three cases are possible.
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Case 1: C = fb1g. Consider the optimal assignment eA10. Then,
u1  (v11    111)  eA1111 + (v11    112)  eA1112 = (2   111)  2 + (2   112)  1:
Case 2: C = fs1g: Consider the optimal assignment eA10. Then,
w1  ( 111   r11)  eA1111 = ( 111   1)  2:
Case 3: C = fs2g: Consider the optimal assignment eA20. Then,
w2  ( 112   r12)  eA2112 = ( 112   1)  2:
Hence,
3 = u1 + w1 + w2  (2   111)  2 + (2   112)  1 + ( 111   1)  2 + ( 112   1)  2 = 2 +  112:
This implies that  112 = 1 because  112  1 = r12: Symmetrically, and by exchanging the
roles of eA10 and eA20, we obtain that  111 = 1: Hence, w1 = w2 = 0 and u1 = 3. Therefore, by
just checking singleton coalitions we already know (since SW 6= ?) that SW = f(3; 0; 0)g:
We now show that (2; 1; 0) 2 C: Since v(fb1; s1; s2g) = 3; v(fb1; s1g) = v(fb1; s2g) = 2;
and v(fs1; s2g) = v(fb1g) = v(fs1g) = v(fs2g) = 0, we conclude that C = f(3   1  
2; 1; 2) j 1  0; 2  0 and 1 + 2  1g. Hence, (2; 1; 0) 2 C. 
Thus, we have already showed that the statement of the following corollary holds.4
Corollary 1 For every market M , ? 6= CE  SW  C. Moreover, the two inclusions
may be strict.
5 The  fold Replicated Market: Three Limit Results
Competitive equilibrium presupposes that agents are price-takers. This assumption makes
sense only when the number of agents is large and individual quantity decisions are in-
signicant. Thus, and at the light of Corollary 1, it is natural to ask whether the Core and
the set of competitive equilibrium payo¤s are approximately the same when the number of
agents becomes large. By Corollary 1, an a¢ rmative answer to this question would imply
that the Set-wise stable set tends to the set of competitive equilibrium payo¤s as well. To
4The same inclusion relationships hold in the time-sharing assignment game considered by Sotomayor
(2009).
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enlarge the market, we follow a procedure with a long tradition in Economics which consists
of replicating the market.5 Given a market M = (B;G; S; V; d; R;Q) and a strictly positive
integer  we will consider the  fold replicated market M to be composed of  agents
of each type. For two buyers i 2 B and i0 2 B0 (in replicas  and 0, respectively)
to be of the same type we require them to have the same valuations of all goods (i.e.,
vij = vi0j = vij for all j 2 G) and the same maximal demands (i.e., di = di0 = di). For
two sellers k 2 S and k0 2 S0 (in replicas  and 0, respectively) to be of the same type
we require them to have the same reservation prices of all goods (i.e., rjk = rjk0 = rjk for
all j 2 G) and the same amounts of all goods (i.e., qjk = qjk0 = qjk for all j 2 G).
The following proposition says that the classical result stating that any payo¤ vector in
the Core assigns the same utility to all agents of the same type also holds in this setting.6
Proposition 7 Let M be a market and let   2: Then
CM  f(u; w)  ((u;w); :::; (u;w)| {z }
 times
) 2 (RB1  RS1) ::: (RB  RS) j (u;w) 2 CMg:
Proof See the appendix. 
We will say that a payo¤ vector (u;w) 2 RB  RS is in the Core of the  replicated
market if (u; w) 2 CM . Our rst limit result states that, for every marketM , the sequence
of Cores of the M markets converges, when !1, to the set of competitive equilibrium
payo¤s of the replicated market.
Theorem 1 Let M be a market. If (u;w) 2 RB  RS is in the Core of the  fold
replicated market for all   1, then (u;w) is a competitive equilibrium payo¤ of market
M .
Proof See the appendix. 
5It started by Edgeworth (1881) and pursued by Debreu and Scarf (1963) for classical economies with
production and by Owen (1975) for linear production games, among others. A linear production game
consists of a set of players, each with an endowment (non necessarily integer valued) of m goods that can
only be used to produce in a linear way units of p di¤erent goods for which there are competitive markets.
Owen (1975) shows that the sequence of Cores of replicated linear production games converges to the set
of competitive equilibrium payo¤s. Moreover, Owen (1975) also shows that if the competitive equilibrium
price is unique then the Core of a large but nitely replicated game coincides with the (unique) competitive
equilibrium payo¤.
6See Debreu and Scar¤ (1963) and Owen (1975) for this equal treatment result in classical economies
with production and in linear production games, respectively.
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Note that, by Corollary 1 and Proposition 7, we have that for all   1,
SWM  f((u;w); :::; (u;w)| {z }
 times
) 2 (RB1  RS1) ::: (RB  RS) j (u;w) 2 SWMg
Theorem 1 only guarantees convergence in the limit. In contrast, our second main result
states that the Set-wise stable set of the 2 fold replicated market already coincides with
the set of competitive equilibrium payo¤s.
Theorem 2 Let (u;w) 2 RB+  RS+ be a payo¤ vector of market M: Then,
((u;w); (u;w)) 2 SW2M if and only if (u;w) 2 CE :
Proof See the appendix. 
Theorem 3 shows that a similar result does not hold for the Core. Namely, for each
number  of replicas there exists a market M for which the Core of the  fold replicated
market contains a payo¤ that is not a competitive equilibrium payo¤.
Theorem 3 Let  2 Z+nf0g. Then, there exist a market M and a payo¤ vector (u;w) =2
CE such that (u; w) 2 CM .
Proof See the appendix. 
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Appendix: Preliminaries and Omitted Proofs
We start with some preliminaries. Let M be a market and C be a coalition. Consider the
primal linear problem to which any optimal assignment eAC 2 eFC is a solution.
(PLP)C: max
(Aijk)(i;j;k)2BCGCSC2RB
CGCSC
P
(i;j;k)2BCGCSC
 ijk  Aijk
s. t. (P.1)
P
(j;k)2GCSC
Aijk  di for all i 2 BC ;
(P.2)
P
i2BC
Aijk  qjk for all (j; k) 2 GC  SC ;
(P.3) Aijk  0 for all (i; j; k) 2 BC GC  SC :
The dual linear problem associated to (PLP)C is the following.
(DLP)C: min
(C ;C)2RBCRGCSC
P
i2BC di  Ci +
P
(j;k)2GCSC qjk  Cjk
s. t. (D.1) Ci + 
C
jk   ijk for all (i; j; k) 2 BC GC  SC ;
(D.2) Ci  0 for all i 2 BC ;
(D.3) Cjk  0 for all (j; k) 2 GC  SC :
Let DC be the set of pairs (C ; C) for which (D.1), (D.2) and (D.3) hold and let eDC
be the set of all solutions of the (DLP)C : It is well-known that eDC is non-empty. We will
denote the sets eDB[S and DB[S by eD and D respectively, and (B[S; B[S) by (; ) 2 D.
Let M be a market and let C be a coalition. Then, it is immediate to check that the
following two implications hold.
If (; ) 2 D then ((i)i2BC ; (jk)(j;k)2GCSC ) 2 DC (13)
and
if (; ) 2 eD then ((i)i2BC ; (jk)(j;k)2GCSC ) 2 eDC : (14)
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Let M be a market and (; ) 2 D be a dual feasible solution. We write TDM(; ) to
denote the value of the objective function of the (DLP)B[S at (; ); that is,
TDM (; ) =
P
i di  i +
P
jk qjk  jk:
The Strong Duality Theorem (SDT) of Linear Programming applied to our setting says the
following (see Dantzig, 1963).
Strong Duality Theorem Let M be a market and assume A 2 F and (; ) 2 D.
Then,
A 2 eF and (; ) 2 eD if and only if TM(A) = TDM(; ): (15)
Given (; ) 2 D; dene its associated payo¤ (u(;); w(:)) 2 RB  RS as follows:
u
(;)
i = i  di for all i 2 B
w
(;)
k =
P
j2G
jk  qjk for all k 2 S:
Proposition 1 Every market has a non-empty Core.
Proof of Proposition 1 Let M be a market and let (e; e) 2 eD be a solution of the
(DLP)B[S: We will show that the payo¤ vector (u(e;e); w(e;e)) 2 RB  RS belongs to the
Core of M . We rst show thatP
i2B
u
(e;e)
i +
P
k2S
w
(e;e)
k = v(B [ S): (16)
By the Strong Duality Theorem, TDM(e; e) = TM( eA) for all eA 2 eF . Thus,P
i2B
di  ei + P
(j;k)2GS
qjk  ejk = TDM(e; e)
and TM( eA) = v(B [ S): Hence, (16) holds.
Let C  B [ S be an arbitrary coalition. We shall show thatP
i2BC
u
(eC ;eC)
i +
P
k2SC
w
(eC ;eC)
k  v(C): (17)
Observe rst that, by (14), (eC ; eC) 2 eDC : Therefore, for every (C ; C) 2 DC ; we have
that P
i2BC
di  Ci +
P
(j;k)2GCSC
qjk  Cjk 
P
i2BC
di  eCi + P
(j;k)2GCSC
qjk  eCjk = v(C): (18)
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The last equality follows from the Strong Duality Theorem. By the denition of the payo¤
vector (u(eC ;eC); w(eC ;eC)) 2 RBC  RSC ,P
i2BC
u
(eC ;eC)
i +
P
k2SC
w
(eC ;eC)
k =
P
i2BC
di  eCi + P
(j;k)2GCSC
qjk  eCjk:
Hence, by (18), (17) holds. Since C was an arbitrary coalition, (u(e;e); w(e;e)) 2 RB  RS
belongs to the Core of M . 
Proposition 5 Let ep 2 eP be a competitive equilibrium price vector of market M . Then,
(u(ep); w(ep)) 2 SW.
Proof of Proposition 5 Let ep 2 eP . We rst show thatP
i2B
ui(ep) + P
k2S
wk(ep) = v(B [ S): (19)
By Theorem 2 in Jaume, Massó, and Neme (2009), ((ep); (ep)) 2 eD. Hence,
TDM((ep); (ep)) = P
i2B
di  i(ep) + P
(j;k)2GS
qjk  jk(ep): (20)
By the denition of (u(ep); w(ep)) 2 Rm  Rt;P
i2B
di  i(ep) + P
(j;k)2GS
qjk  jk(ep) = P
i2B
ui(ep) + P
k2S
wk(ep): (21)
By (20) and (21),
TDM((ep); (ep)) = P
i2B
ui(ep) + P
k2S
wk(ep):
Hence, by the Strong Duality Theorem, (19) holds:
Assume (u(ep); w(ep)) =2 SW. Then, there exists a coalition C  B[S that SW blocks it.
Hence, for every distribution matrix   = ( ijk)(i;j;k)2BGS there exists a feasible assignmentbA that is SW compatible with C such thatP
i2BC
ui(ep) + P
k2SC
wk(ep) < P
(i;j;k)2BCGSC
 ijk  bAijk + P
(i;j;k)2BCG(SC)c
(vij    ijk)  bAijk
+
P
(i;j;k)2(BC)cGSC
( ijk   rjk)  bAijk:
Consider the distribution matrix   = ( ijk)(i;j;k)2BGS where for each (i; j; k) 2 BGS,
 ijk = epj. Then, there must exist a feasible assignment bA that is SW compatible with C
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such thatP
i2BC
ui(ep) + P
k2SC
wk(ep) < P
(i;j;k)2BCGSC
 ijk  bAijk + P
(i;j;k)2BCG(SC)c
(vij   epj)  bAijk
+
P
(i;j;k)2(BC)cGSC
(epj   rjk)  bAijk:
(22)
Now, dene the feasible assignment A as follows: for each (i; j; k) 2 B G S,
Aijk =
(
0 if either fi; kg  C or fi; kg  CcbAijk otherwise,
where Cc is the complementary set of C. Dene a new market M =
 
B; S;G; V; d; R;Q

;
where the new vector of maximal demands d is dened by setting
di = di  
P
(j;k)2GS
Aijk
for all i 2 B, and the new matrix of capacities Q is dened by setting
qjk = qjk  
P
i2B
Aijk
for all (j; k) 2 G  S. Note that if i 2 C then, di = di  
P
(j;k)2G(SC)c bAijk and if k 2 C
then, qjk = qjk  
P
i2(BC)c bAijk for all j 2 G:
By (10), P
i2BC
ui(ep) + P
k2SC
wk(ep) = P
i2BC
di  i(ep) + P
(j;k)2GSC
qjk  jk(ep);
and note that P
i2BC
di  i(ep) = P
i2BC
di  i(ep) + P
i2BC
(
P
(j;k)2GS
Aijk)  i(ep)
=
P
i2BC
di  i(ep) + P
i2BC
(
P
j2G
P
k2(SC)c
bAijk)  i(ep)
and for each j 2 G,P
k2SC
qjk  jk(ep) = P
k2SC
qjk  jk(ep) + P
k2SC
(
P
i2B
Aijk)  jk(ep)
=
P
k2SC
qjk  jk(ep) + P
k2SC
(
P
i2(BC)c
bAijk)  jk(ep):
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Hence,P
i2BC
ui(ep) + P
k2SC
wk(ep) = P
i2BC
di  i(ep) + P
i2BC
(
P
j2G
P
k2(SC)c
bAijk)  i(ep)
+
P
k2SC
P
j2G
qjk  jk(ep) + P
k2SC
P
j2G
(
P
i2(BC)c
bAijk)  jk(ep): (23)
By (8), for every i 2 B and j 2 G,
i(ep)  vij   epj: (24)
Moreover, by (9), for every (j; k) 2 G S;
jk(ep)  epj   rjk: (25)
By (22) and (23)P
(i;j;k)2BCGSC
 ijk  bAijk + P
(i;j;k)2BCG(SC)c
(vij   epj)  bAijk+P
(i;j;k)2(BC)cGSC
(epj   rjk)  bAijk > P
i2BC
di  i(ep) + P
i2BC
(
P
j2G
P
k2(SC)c
bAijk)  i(ep)
+
P
k2SC
P
j2G
qjk  jk(ep) + P
k2SC
P
j2G
(
P
i2(BC)c
bAijk)  jk(ep): (26)
By (24), P
i2BC
(
P
j2G
P
k2(SC)c
bAijk)  i(ep)  P
(i;j;k)2BCG(SC)c
(vij   epj)  bAijk:
Hence, by (26),P
(i;j;k)2BCGSC
 ijk  bAijk + P
(i;j;k)2(BC)cGSC
(epj   rjk)  bAijk >P
i2BC
di  i(ep) + P
k2SC
P
j2G
qjk  jk(ep)
+
P
k2SC
P
j2G
(
P
i2(BC)c
bAijk)  jk(ep): (27)
By (25), P
k2SC
P
j2G
(
P
i2(BC)c
bAijk)  jk(ep)  P
(i;j;k)2(BC)cGSC
(epj   rjk)  bAijk:
Hence, by (27), P
(i;j;k)2BCGSC
 ijk  bAijk > P
i2BC
di  i(ep) + P
k2SC
P
j2G
qjk  jk(ep): (28)
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Observe that since bA is a feasible assignment,
vM(C)  P
(i;j;k)2BCGSC
 ijk  bAijk;
where vM(C) = TM( eAC) for any optimal assignment eAC of marketM . Since ((ep); (ep)) 2eD then by (14), (C(ep); C(ep)) 2 eDC for marketM . Hence, by the Strong Duality Theorem,P
i2BC
di  i(ep) + P
k2SC
P
j2G
qjk  jk(ep) = vM(C);
contradicting (28). 
Proposition 6 Let (u;w) 2 RB  RS be a payo¤ of market M . Then, (u;w) 2 CE if
and only if there exists a competitive equilibrium price vector ep such that for every coalition
C  B [ S and any feasible assignment bA SW compatible with C we have thatP
i2BC
ui +
P
k2SC
wk 
P
(i;j;k)2BCGSC
 ijk  bAijk+ P
(i;j;k)2BCG(SC)c
(vij   epj) bAijk:+ P
(i;j;k)2(BC)cGSC
(epj   rjk) bAijk:
Proof of Proposition 6
)) It follows from Proposition 5.
() Let (u;w) 2 RB  RS be a payo¤ of market M . Consider rst any coalition C = fig;
where i 2 B: Then, by assumption,
ui 
P
(j;k)2GS
(vij   epj)  bAijk; (29)
where bA is any feasible assignment.
Consider now any coalition C = fkg, where k 2 S: Then, by assumption,
wk 
P
(i;j)2BG
(epj   rjk)  bAijk; (30)
where bA is any feasible assignment.
Finally, assume that eA is an optimal assignment. Then,P
i2B
ui +
P
k2S
wk = v(B [ S) =
P
(i;j;k)2BGS
 ijk  eAijk:
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By denition of the per unit gains  ijk,P
(i;j;k)2BGS
 ijk  eAijk = P
i2B
P
(j;k)2GS
(vij   epj)  eAijk + P
k2S
P
(i;j)2BG
(epj   rjk)  eAijk:
Hence, (29) and (30) imply that for every i 2 B and k 2 S,
ui =
P
(j;k)2GS
(vij   epj)  eAijk
wk =
P
(i;j)2BG
(epj   rjk)  eAijk;
and consequently, by Lemma 6 in Jaume, Massó, and Neme (2009), for every i 2 B and
k 2 S,
ui = di  i(ep)  0
wk =
P
j2G
qjk  jk(ep)  0:
Thus, (u;w) = (u(ep); w(ep)) and by (11), (u;w) 2 CE . 
Proposition 7 Let M be a market and let   2: Then
CM  f(u; w)  ((u;w); :::; (u;w)| {z }
 times
) 2 (RB1  RS1) ::: (RB  RS) j (u;w) 2 CMg:
Proof of Proposition 7 Let ((bui1 ; :::; bui)i2B; ( bwk1 ; :::; bwk)k2S) 2 CM : For every  =
1; :::; , X
i2B
bui + X
k2S
bwk  v(B [ S) = v(B [ S)
must hold; otherwise, any coalition C = B [ S would Core block (bu; bw). Hence, for
every  = 1; :::; , X
i2B
bui + X
k2S
bwk = v(B [ S):
Assume that there exists a buyer type bi 2 B and two replicas  and 0 such that
bubi > bubi0 :
Then, the coalition C = [(B [ S)nfbig] [ fbi0g Core blocks (bu; bw) because
v(C) = v(B [ S) >
X
i2Bnfbig
bui + bubi0 + X
k2S
bwk :
25
Similarly for any seller type bk 2 S. Thus, ((bui1 ; :::; bui)i2B; ( bwk1 ; :::; bwk)k2S) = (u; w) for
some payo¤ vector (u;w) 2 RB  RS of market M .
To obtain a contradiction, assume that (u;w) =2 CM . Then, there exists a coalition
C that Core blocks (u;w): But then, C also Core blocks (bu; bw), a contradiction with
(bu; bw) 2 CM . 
Theorem 1 Let M be a market. If (u;w) 2 RB  RS is in the Core of the  fold
replicated market for all   1, then (u;w) is a competitive equilibrium payo¤ of market
M .
Proof of Theorem 1 It follows from Lemma 1 below.7 
Lemma 1 LetM be a market and assume that (u;w) 2 RBRS is such that (u; w) 2 CM
for all   1: Then, there exists a solution (; ) 2 eD of (DLP)B[S such that ui = di  i
for every i 2 B, and wk =
P
j jk  qjk for every k 2 S; namely, (u;w) 2 CE :
Proof of Lemma 1 Let (u;w) 2 RB RS be a payo¤ vector of market M . Consider the
following system of inequalities
( di)  i   ui for all i 2 BP
j( qjk)  jk   wk for all k 2 S
i + jk   ijk for all (i; j; k) 2 B G S
i  0 for all i 2 B
jk  0 for all (j; k) 2 G S:
(31)
Claim (u;w) 2 CE if and only if the system in (31) has at least one solution (; ).
Proof of Claim Necessity follows from (10). To show su¢ ciency suppose (; ) is a
solution of (31). Then,P
i di  i +
P
jk qjk  jk  v(B [ S)
i + 

jk   ijk for all (i; j; k) 2 B G S
i  0 for all i 2 B
jk  0 for all (j; k) 2 G S:
7Our proof adapts Owen (1975)s proof of the convergence of the Core to the set of competitive equilib-
rium payo¤s for linear programming games.
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Thus, by the Strong Duality Theorem, (; ) is a solution of the (DLP)B[S. Hence,
(u;w) 2 CE . This proves the claim. 
Consider the following Primal Linear Problem
min
(;)2RBRGS
P
i2B
(i  0) +
P
(j;k)2GS
(jk  0)
s.t. ( di)  i   ui for all i 2 BP
j( qjk)  jk   wk for all k 2 S
i + jk   ijk for all (i; j; k) 2 B G S
i  0 for all i 2 B
jk  0 for all (j; k) 2 G S;
and its associated Dual Linear Problem
max
y12RB
y22RS
y32RBGS
P
i y
1
i  ( ui) +
P
k y
2
k  ( wk) +
P
ijk y
3
ijk   ijk
s.t. ( di)  y1i +
P
jk y
3
ijk  0 for all i 2 B
( qjk)  y2k +
P
i y
3
ijk  0 for all (j; k) 2 G S
y1  0
y2  0
y3  0:
Assume the system in (31) has no solution. Then, the Primal Linear Problem has no
solution and the Dual Linear Problem has no solution either, and since
 !
0 is a feasible vector
of the Dual Linear Problem, the linear function
P
i y
1
i ( ui)+
P
k y
2
k ( wk)+
P
ijk y
3
ijk  ijk
is unbounded. But this implies that there exists (y1; y2; y3) such thatP
i y
1
i  ui +
P
k y
2
k  wk < y3ijk   ijkP
jk y
3
ijk  di  y1i for all i 2 BP
i y
3
ijk  qjk  y2k for all (j; k) 2 G S
y1  0
y2  0
y3  0:
Since the rst restriction holds with strict inequality, y1; y2 and y3 can be vectors with
rational components. Multiplying them by the lowest common denominator we can assume,
without loss of generality, that y1i 2 N for all i 2 B and y2k 2 N for all k 2 S.
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Dene  = maxfy11; :::; y1m; y21; :::; y2t g and let C be a coalition containing y1i buyers of
type i; and y2k sellers of type k: Observe that v(C) 
P
ijk y
3
ijk   ijk and hence, v(C) >P
i y
1
i ui+
P
k y
2
k wk: Thus, (u; w) is Core-blocked by C, a contradiction with the general
assumption of Lemma 1. Hence, the Primal Linear Problem has a solution. By the Claim,
(u;w) 2 CE . 
Theorem 2 Let (u;w) 2 RB  RS be a payo¤ vector of market M: Then,
((u;w; ); (u;w)) 2 SW2M if and only if (u;w) 2 CE :
Proof of Theorem 2 Assume rst that (u;w) 2 CE . Then, by Corollary 1 and Propo-
sition 7, ((u;w); (u;w)) 2 SW2M :
Assume now that ((u;w; ); (u;w)) 2 SW2M : Then, there exists a distribution matrix
  = ( ijk)(i;j;k)22BG2S such that for every coalition C  2B [ 2S and every feasible
assignment bA that is SW-compatible with C we have that:P
i2(2B)C
ui +
P
k2(2S)C
wk 
P
(i;j;k)2(2B)CG(2S)C
 ijk  bAijk + P
(i;j;k)2(2B)CG((2S)C)c
(vij    ijk)  bAijk
+
P
(i;j;k)2((2B)C)cG(2S)C
( ijk   rjk)  bAijk:
(32)
Fix   and let eA 2 eF be any optimal assignment of market M .
Claim 1 For every i 2 B and every k 2 S;
ui =
P
(j;k)2GS
(vij    ijk)  eAijk
and
wk =
P
(i;j)2BG
( ijk   rjk)  eAijk:
hold.
Proof of Claim 1 By considering either C = fig or C = fkg; we have that, by (32),
ui 
P
(j;k)2GS
(vij    ijk)  eAijk for every i 2 B
and
wk 
P
(i;j)2BG
( ijk   rjk)  eAijk for every k 2 S:
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SinceP
i2B
P
(j;k)2GS
(vij    ijk) eAijk+P
k2S
P
(i;j)2BG
( ijk   rjk) eAijk = P
(i;j;k)2BGS
 ijk eAijk = TM( eA)
and
TM( eA) = P
i2B
ui +
P
k2S
wk;
the statement of Claim 1 follows. 
Claim 2 Let i1; i2; j0; k1; k2 be such that eAi1j0k1 6= 0 6= eAi2j0k2 : Then,  i1j0k1 =  i2j0k2 :
Proof of Claim 2 Assume otherwise; for instance,  i1j0k1 >  i2j0k2 : If  i2j0k2 >  i1j0k1 ;
then replace in the argument that follows the roles of i1 by i2 and k2 by k1. Consider
the coalition C = fi1; k2g: From eA we dene the assignment bA SW compatible with C
by decreasing in 1 unit the exchanges between i1 and k1 and between i2 and k2 and by
simultaneously increasing in 1 unit the exchange between i1 and k2: Namely, for every
(i; j; k) 2 B G S, dene
bAijk =
8>>><>>>:
eAijk   1 if i = i01; j = j0 and k = k01eAijk   1 if i = i02; j = j0 and k = k02eAijk + 1 if i = i01; j = j0 and k = k02eAijk otherwise.
Observe that since by assumption eAi1j0k1 6= 0 6= eAi2j0k2, bA is a feasible assignment. More-
over, bA is SW compatible with C = fi1; k2g. Dene
bui1 = P
(j;k)2GS
(vij    ijk)  bAijk
and bwk2 = P
(i;j)2BG
( ijk   rjk)  bAijk:
By Claim 1 and the denition of bA,
u11 + wk2   (bu11 + bwk2) = (vi1j0    i1j0k1)  eAi1j0k1 + (vi1j0    i1j0k2)  eAi1j0k2
+( i1j0k2   rj0k2)  eAi1j0k2 + ( i2j0k2   rj0k2)  eAi2j0k2
 (vi1j0    i1j0k1)  bAi1j0k1   (vi1j0    i1j0k2)  bAi1j0k2
 ( i1j0k2   rj0k2)  bAi1j0k2   ( i2j0k2   rj0k2)  bAi2j0k2
= (vi1j0    i1j0k1)  (vi1j0    i1j0k2)
 ( i1j0k2   rj0k2) + ( i2j0k2   rj0k2)
=   i1j0k1 +  i2j0k2 :
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Since by assumption  i1j0k1 >  i2j0k2 ; we have that u11 + wk2 < bu11 + bwk2 ; a contradiction
with (32). 
To proceed with the proof of Theorem 2 we dene a price vector p = (pj)j2G 2 RG as
follows. Consider rst any j 2 G for which there exist i 2 B and k 2 S such that Aijk 6= 0
for some optimal assignment A. Then, dene pj =  ijk: By Claim 2, pj is well dened.
Suppose now that j 2 G is such that for all optimal assignment A and all i 2 B and k 2 S,
Aijk = 0. Then, dene pj = minfrjk j k is such that qjk > 0g; by (2), pj is well-dened.
Let A 2 eF be arbitrary. We shall show that (p;A) is a competitive equilibrium of M by
showing that the equilibrium conditions (E.D) and (E.S) are satised.
(E.D) For each buyer i 2 B; A(i) 2 Di (p) :
Since A 2 eF ; (D.a) and (D.b) hold.
(D.c): r>i (p) 6= ; =)
P
jk A(i)jk = di:
Assume r>i0 (p) 6= ;; i.e., there exists j0 2 G such that vi0j0 pj0 = maxj2Gfvi0j pjg > 0:
Assume that X
jk
Ai0jk < di0 : (33)
Without loss of generality suppose that i0 belongs to the rst replica; i.e., i0 = i1. Consider
rst the case where there are i2 2 B2 and k2 2 S2 with the property that Ai2j0k2 6= 0.
Consider the coalition C = fi1; k2g and its SW compatible assignment bA where, for all
(i; j; k) 2 B G S,
bAijk =
8><>:
Aijk + 1 if i = i1; j = j0 and k = k2
Aijk   1 if i = i2; j = j0 and k = k2
Aijk otherwise.
By (33) and Ai2j0k2 6= 0, bA is a feasible assignment and SW compatible with coalition
fi1; k2g. Then, proceeding in a similar way as we did in the proof of Claim 2, dene bui1 andbwk2 as the payo¤s of buyer i1 and seller k2 at assignment bA, respectively. Then, By Claim
1 and the denition of bA,
ui1 + wk2   (bui1 + bwk2) = (vi1j0    i1j0k2)  Ai1j0k2
+( i1j0k2   rj0k2)  Ai1j0k2 + ( i2j0k2   rj0k2)  Ai2j0k2
 (vi1j0    i1j0k2)  bAi1j0k2
 ( i1j0k2   rj0k2)  bAi1j0k2   ( i2j0k2   rj0k2)  bAi2j0k2
=  (vi1j0    i1j0k2)  ( i1j0k2   rj0k2) + ( i2j0k2   rj0k2)
=  vi1j0 +  i2j0k2 :
30
By (32),  vi1j0 +  i2j0k2  0: Since Ai2j0k2 6= 0, by denition of pj0, 0  vi1j0   pj0 ; a
contradiction with j0 2 r>i1(p):
Assume now that for all i00 2 2B and all k00 2 2S, Ai00j0k00 = 0. By denition, pj0 =
minfrj0k j k is such that qj0k > 0g: Let k 2 2S be such that qj0k > 0 and pj0k = rj0k.
By (2), such k does exist. Consider the coalition C = fi1; kg and its SW compatible
assignment bA where, for all (i; j; k) 2 2B G 2S
bAijk = ( Aijk + 1 if i = i1; j = j0 and k = k
Aijk otherwise.
By (33) and qj0k > 0, bA is a feasible assignment. Then, as before,
ui1 + wk   (bui1 + bwk) = (vi1j0    i1j0k)  Ai1j0k + ( i1j0k   rj0k)  Ai1j0k
 (vi1j0    i1j0k)  bAi1j0k   ( i1j0k   rj0k)  bAi1j0k
=  (vi1j0    i1j0k)  ( i1j0k   rj0k)
=  vi1j0 + ri1j0k :
By (32),  vi1j0 + ri1j0k  0: Since pj0 = rj0k, vi1j0   pj0  0; contradicting that j0 2 r>i1(p):
(D.d):
P
k A(i)jk > 0 =) j 2 ri (p):
Assume otherwise; i.e., there exist i0; j0; k0 such that Ai0j0k0 6= 0 and j0 =2 ri0 (p): We
distinguish between the following two cases.
Case 1: vi0j0   pj0 < 0: Consider the coalition C = fi0g and its compatible assignment bA
where bAijk = ( 0 if i = i0; j = j0 and k = k0
Aijk otherwise.
Dene bui0 as the utility of buyer i0 at assignment bA: Then, it is immediate to see that
ui0 < bui0 ; contradicting (32).
Case 2: There exists j00 2 ri0 (p) such that
(vi0j00   pj00) > (vi0j0   pj0)  0: (34)
Note that Ai0j0k0 6= 0: By denition of p, pj0 =  i0j0k0 : Assume rst that there exist i00 2 2B
and k00 2 2S such that Ai00j00k00 6= 0: Again, by denition p, pj00 =  i00j00k00 : Consider the
coalition C = fi0; k00g and its SW compatible assignment bA where, for all (i; j; k) 2 B 
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G S,
bAijk =
8>>><>>>:
Aijk   1 if i = i0; j = j0 and k = k0
Aijk   1 if i = i00; j = j00 and k = k00
Aijk + 1 if i = i0; j = j00 and k = k00
Aijk otherwise.
Then, proceeding in a similar way as we did in the proof of Claim 2, dene bui0 and bwk00 as
the payo¤s of buyer i0 and seller k00 at assignment bA, respectively. Then, By Claim 1 and
the denition of bA,
ui0 + wk00   (bui0 + bwk00) = (vi0j0    i0j0k0)  Ai0j0k0 + (vi0j00    i0j00k00)  Ai0j00k00
+( i0j00k00   rj00k00)  Ai0j00k00 + ( i00j00k00   rj00k00)  Ai00j00k00
 (vi0j0    i0j0k0)  bAi0j0k0   (vi0j00    i0j00k00)  bAi0j00k00
 ( i0j00k00   rj00k00)  bAi0j00k00   ( i00j00k00   rj00k00)  bAi00j00k00
= (vi0j0    i0j0k0)  (vi0j00    i0j00k00)  ( i0j00k00   rj00k00) + ( i00j00k00   rj00k00)
= vi0j0   pj0   vi0j00 + pj00   pj00 + rj00k00 + pj00   rj00k00
= vi0j0   pj0   (vi0j00   pj00):
By (34), ui0 + wk00   (bui0 + bwk00) < 0, a contradiction with (32). Assume now that for
all i00 2 2B and all k00 2 2S, Ai00j00k00 = 0: By denition, pj00 = minfrj00k j k is such that
qj00k > 0g: Let k 2 2S be such that qj00k > 0 and pj00 = rj00k : By (2), such k does exist.
Consider the coalition C = fi0; kg and its SW compatible assignment bA where, for all
(i; j; k) 2 B G S,
bAijk =
8><>:
Aijk   1 if i = i0; j = j0 and k = k0
1 if i = i0; j = j00 and k = k
Aijk otherwise.
Then, proceeding as before, dene bui0 and bwk as the payo¤s of buyer i0 and seller k at
assignment bA, respectively. Then, By Claim 1 and the denition of bA,
ui0 + wk   (bui0 + bwk) = (vi0j0    i0j0k0)  Ai0j0k0   (vi0j0    i0j0k0)  bAi0j0k0
 (vi0j00    i0j00k)  bAi0j00k   ( i0j00k   rj00k)  bAi0j00k
= (vi0j0    i0j0k0)  (vi0j00    i0j00k)  ( i0j00k   rj00k)
= vi0j0   pj0   (vi0j00   rj00k):
By (32), vi0j0   pj0  vi0j00   rj00k : Since by its denition, pj00 = rj00k ; vi0j0   pj0  vi0j00   pj00 ;
a contradiction with (34).
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(E.S) For each good j 2 G and each seller k 2 S; PiAijk 2 Sjk (pj) :
Fix j0 2 G and k0 2 S. Assume rst that pj0 < rj0k0 : We want to show that
P
iAij0k0 =
0: Suppose that Ai0j0k0 6= 0: Consider the coalition C = fk0g and its SW compatible
assignment bA where, for every (i; j; k) 2 B G S,
bAijk = ( 0 if i = i0; j = j0 and k = k0
Aijk otherwise.
Dene bwk0 as the utility of seller k0 at assignment bA: Then, it is immediate to see that
wk0 < bwk0 ; contradicting (32).
Assume now that pj0 = rj0k0 :We want to show that 0 
P
iAij0k0  qj0k0 : But this holds
because A is a feasible assignment.
Finally, assume that pj0 > rj0k0 : We want to show that
P
iAij0k0 = qj0k0 : AssumeP
iAij0k0 < qj0k0 : Hence,
qj0k0 > 0: (35)
Consider rst the case where there exist i0 2 2B and k00 2 2S such that Ai0j0k00 6= 0: Then,
by denition of p and Claim 2, pj0 =  i0j0k00 =  i0j0k0 : Consider the coalition C = fi0; k0g and
its SW compatible assignment bA where, for all (i; j; k) 2 B G S,
bAijk =
8><>:
Aijk   1 if i = i0; j = j0 and k = k00
Aijk + 1 if i = i0; j = j0 and k = k0
Aijk otherwise.
Then, proceeding in a similar way as we did in the proof of Claim 2, dene bui0 and bwk0 as
the payo¤s of buyer i0 and seller k0 at assignment bA, respectively. Then, by Claim 1 and
the denition of bA,
ui0 + wk0   (bui0 + bwk0) = (vi0j0    i0j0k00)  Ai0j0k00 + (vi0j0    i0j0k0)  Ai0j0k0
+( i0j0k0   rj0k0)  Ai0j0k0
 (vi0j0    i0j0k00)  bAi0j0k00   (vi0j0    i0j0k0)  bAi0j0k0
 ( i0j0k0   rj0k0)  bAi0j0k0
= (vi0j0    i0j0k00)  (vi0j0    i0j0k0)
 ( i0j0k0   rj0k0)
=  pj0 + rj0k0 :
Since by assumption pj0 > rj0k0, ui0+wk0 (bui0+ bwk0) < 0, a contradiction with (32). Assume
now that for all i0 2 2B and all k00 2 2S, Ai0j0k00 = 0: By denition, pj0 = minfrj0k j k is
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such that qj0k > 0g: Let k 2 2S be such that qj0k > 0 and pj0 = rj0k : By (2), such k
does exist. By (35) and the denition of pj0, pj0  rj0k0, a contradiction with the initial
assumption that pj0 > rj0k0. 
Theorem 3 Let  2 Z+nf0g. Then, there exist a market M and a payo¤ vector (u;w) =2
CE such that (u; w) 2 CM .
Proof of Theorem 3 Fix  2 Z+nf0g. Dene M as follows: B = fb1g; S = fs1; s2g,
G = fg1g, v11 = 1, r11 = r12 = 0, d1 = 4   1 and q11 = q12 = 2. It is easy to see that
since the short side of the market is the demand, the unique competitive equilibrium price
is ep1 = 0 and CE = f(4  1; 0; 0)g. Consider the payo¤ vector (4  3; 1; 1) =2 CE :We show
that ((4  3); (1; 1)) 2 CM : Let C be a coalition in market M with #(
S
=1
BC ) =  and
#(
S
=1
SC ) = : Thus,
   and   =2: (36)
The value of coalition C is
v(C) =
(
(4  1) if 2  
2 if 2 > 
(37)
and P
i2BC
ui +
P
k2SC
wk = (4  3) + : (38)
We want to show that for all  and  satisfying (36),P
i2BC
ui +
P
k2SC
wk  v(C): (39)
Assume rst that C is such that 2  . Then, by (37) and (38), (39) holds if and only
if (4  3) +   (4  1) holds, which follows from 2  .
Assume now that C is such that 2 > . Then, by (37) and (38), (39) holds if and only
if (4  3) +   2 holds. Thus, to show that (39) holds is equivalent to show that
(4  3)  (2  1) (40)
holds. By (36), the most disfavourable case for which (40) holds is when  is larger; i.e.,
 = 2   1. Hence, (40) follows if (4   3)  (2   1)(2   1). But this last inequality
can be written as
4  3  4  2   2+ 1;
which holds because    and   1 imply 2  1  . 
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